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TALK LOUDLY AND CARRY A SMALL STICK:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ENEMY COMBATANTS 
Neal Devins* 
What a difference a year makes.  In the summer of 2008, the Bush 
administration campaign to defend its enemy combatant policies lay 
in shreds.  The Supreme Court had ruled against the administration’s 
initiative in 2004, 2006, and 2008—decisions that had been character-
ized as “the most important decision[s] on presidential power and 
the rule of law ever,”1 (Walter Dellinger), “a disaster for the war ef-
fort,”2 (Robert H. Bork and David B. Rivkin, Jr.), and “a historic re-
buke to the Bush administration,”3 (The Washington Post).  The 2004 
and 2006 rulings declared that Guantánamo Bay detentions were sub-
ject to federal court review and that the administration could not uni-
laterally pursue its enemy combatant policies.  In 2008, the Court 
ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that neither Congress nor the President 
could strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo ha-
beas petitions.4  Making matters worse, with presidential candidates 
Barack Obama and John McCain both agreeing that Guantánamo 
should be closed, the Bush administration’s initiative seemed a politi-
cal as well as a legal casualty.5 
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 1 Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation:  The Most Important Decision on Presidential 
Power.  Ever., SLATE, June 29, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825. 
 2 Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A War the Courts Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 
21, 2005, at A17. 
 3 Robert Barnes, Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, WASH. POST, June 13, 2008, at A1; see 
also Robert S. Greenberger & Jess Bravin, High Court Backs Detainees’ Right to Challenge U.S.:  
In a Blow to Bush Policy, Ruling Says Terror Suspects Are Entitled to Hearings, WALL ST. J., June 
29, 2004, at A1 (indicating that the Court’s Guantánamo decisions are “momentous”). 
 4 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271–74 (2008). 
 5 Keith Perine, High Court Strikes Guantánamo Laws, CQ WEEKLY, June 16, 2008, at 1638 
(“Presumed Democratic presidential nominee Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois said the 
[Boumediene] decision marked ‘an important step toward re-establishing our credibility as 
a nation committed to the rule of law. . . .’  His Republican counterpart, Sen. John 
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One year later, the landmark billing of these rulings seems sus-
pect.  Next-to-no detainees had been released from Guantánamo.  
Even though thirty detainees have prevailed in habeas proceedings,6 
the Obama administration argued that these individuals do not have 
a “constitutional right to enter the United States.”7  Instead, these in-
dividuals were to remain in Guantánamo “in a non-enemy combatant 
status” until they or the administration could locate a country for 
them to return to.8  Further ensuring that Guantánamo detainees 
would remain at Guantánamo, the Democratic Congress enacted 
spending legislation blocking the closing of the facility.9  And, in a re-
lated development, the Obama administration backed Bush admini-
stration efforts to end-run Boumediene by bringing captured detainees 
to Bagram, Afghanistan—claiming that, unlike combatants held at 
the United States base on Guantánamo Bay, “military detainees 
[held] in Afghanistan have no legal right to challenge their impris-
onment there.”10 
Responding to these developments, lawyers for Guantánamo de-
tainees went back to the well—returning to the Supreme Court to 
challenge both Obama administration practices and the federal 
spending law.11  Having prevailed both before the Supreme Court in 
 
McCain of Arizona . . . noted that he had ‘always favored closing . . . Guantánamo Bay.’”).  
Note too that Bush also wanted to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay.  See Steven Lee 
Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantánamo Open, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A16 (noting 
that “[d]espite his stated desire to close the American prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 
President Bush has decided not to do so”). 
 6 See David M. Herszenhorn, In Shift, Leaders of Senate Reject Guantánamo Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2009, at A1 (observing that “[o]f the 240 detainees [at Guantánamo], 30 have 
been cleared for release”). 
 7 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 22, Kiyemba v. Ob-
ama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1234). 
 8 Id. at 1–2. 
 9 See Herszenhorn, supra note 6 (“In an abrupt shift, Senate Democratic leaders said they 
would not provide the $80 million that President Obama requested to close the detention 
center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.”). 
 10 Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds a Policy on Detainees in Afghani-
stan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6.  See also Glenn Greenwald, Obama and Habeas Cor-
pus—Then and Now, SALON.COM, Apr. 11, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/
greenwald/2009/04/11/bagram/index.html (reiterating “that military detainees [held] 
in Afghanistan have no legal right to challenge their imprisonment there”). 
 11 See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Detainees Challenge New Law,  
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/detainees-challenge-new-law/ (June 25, 2009, 10:49 
EST) (“Hours after President Obama signed into law a new set of restrictions on release 
of Guantánamo Bay detainees, lawyers for a group of prisoners told the Supreme 
Court . . . that the law appears to violate the Constitution.”); Posting of Lyle Denniston to 
SCOTUSblog, Detainees:  Habeas Right Now a Nullity,  http://www.scotusblog.com 
/wp/detainees-habeas-right-now-a-nullity/ (June 5, 2009, 12:07 EST) (“One week short of 
the anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, lawyers for 17 
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Boumediene and in subsequent habeas hearings, these litigants de-
clared:  “Something has gone awry. . . .”12 “The Judicial Branch may 
hold hearings; it may even issue vague and unenforceable exhorta-
tions to diplomacy.  But that is all.  It has become the hortatory 
branch.”13  Initially, the Court did not bite.  Notwithstanding the ur-
gency of petitioners’ request, the Court held the case over for its 
2009–2010 term. 
In October 2009, the Court granted certiorari in the case Kiyemba 
v. Obama. 14  By this time, however, the Court’s action received com-
paratively little attention—both in the mainstream press and in legal 
blogs.15  Unlike Bush-era cases (where the Court was seen as invalidat-
ing critically important presidential initiatives), Kiyemba was depicted 
as a low stakes gambit by the Court.  In part, no one thought the case 
would meaningfully alter administration policies.  The Obama ad-
ministration remains committed to closing Guantánamo16 and, in 
September 2009, the administration reversed court on Bagram de-
tainees—allowing detainees to see evidence, call witnesses, and much 
more.17  Furthermore, as several news stories noted, the case would 
 
Guantanamo Bay detainees complained to the Court . . . that the ruling has been reduced 
to a mere exhortation, without legal effect.”). 
 12 Reply to Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certorari at 1, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1234). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Appeal From Uighurs Held at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2009, at A1. 
 15 Major newspapers, while reporting on the cert grant, did little else.  More telling, a quick 
look at two leading law professor blogs (Volokh Conspiracy and Balkinization) suggests 
that the blogosphere largely ignored the grant of certiorari.  From October 20 (the day of 
the grant of certiorari) until October 26, 2009, there were no stories in Volokh Conspir-
acy about the certiorari grant—even though there were several postings on other Su-
preme Court developments and one posting on copyright issues tied to the playing of 
loud rock music at the Guantánamo facility.  See Archive for October, 2009, The Volokh 
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2009/10.  During the same period, Balikinization fea-
tured one story on the grant of certiorari—a cross post from an international law blog, 
OpinioJuris (which featured no other blogs about the case in the week after the granting 
of certiorari.  See Posting of Deborah Pearlstein to Balkinization, Kiyema [sic] v. Obama, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com /2009/10/kiyema-v-obama.html (Oct. 20, 2009, 14:39 EST). 
 16 When commenting on the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, the Obama administration 
noted that the President was committed to closing Guantánamo.  See Posting of Lyle 
Denniston to SCOTUSblog, New Detainee Case Granted, http://www.scotusblog.com 
/wp/new-detainee-case-granted/ (Oct. 20, 2009, 10:05 EST) (DOJ release provided in 
post). 
 17 See Karen De Young & Peter Finn, U.S. Gives New Rights to Afghan Prisoners; Indefinite Deten-
tion Can Be Challenged, WASH. POST, Sept 13, 2009, at A1.  For its part, Congress has 
backed away efforts to prevent the administration from transferring detainees to the 
United States to be tried in federal courts.  Peter Finn, Key Democrats Would Let Guantána-
mo Detainees be Tried in U.S.. WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2009, at A7. 
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directly impact few, if any, detainees.18  By waiting until October to 
grant certiorari in the case, the Court deferred oral arguments (and a 
decision) until the end of its 2009–2010 term.  By that time, the ad-
ministration may seek to moot the case by either shutting down 
Guantánamo or relocating all petitioners.19  
Without question, there are very real differences between the fac-
tual contexts of Kiyemba and Bush-era cases.  These differences, how-
ever, do not account for the striking gap between accounts of Kiyemba 
as likely inconsequential and Bush-era cases as “the most important 
decisions” on presidential power “ever.”20  In the pages that follow, I 
will argue that Kiyemba is cut from the same cloth as Bush-era enemy 
combatant decision making.  Just as Kiyemba will be of limited reach 
(at most signaling the Court’s willingness to impose further limits on 
the government without forcing the government to meaningfully ad-
just its policymaking), Bush-era enemy combatant cases were modest 
incremental rulings.  Notwithstanding claims by academics, opinion 
leaders, and the media, Supreme Court enemy combatant decision 
making did not impose significant rule of law limits on the President 
and Congress.  Bush-era cases were certainly consequential, but they 
never occupied the blockbuster status that so many (on both the left 
and the right) attributed to them.  Throughout the course of the en-
emy combatant dispute, the Court has never risked its institutional 
capital either by issuing a decision that the political branches would 
ignore, or by compelling the executive branch to pursue policies that 
created meaningful risks to national security.  The Court, instead, 
took limited risks to protect its turf and assert its power to “say what 
the law is.”  That was the Court’s practice during the Bush years, and 
it is the Court’s practice today. 
 
 18 See Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Court to Decide on U.S. Release of Uighurs at Gitmo, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 21, 2009, at A10; Liptak, supra note 14. 
 19 Indeed, news accounts of the grant of certiorari reveal that the administration had made 
arrangements to relocate all but one of the original seventeen detainee petitioners.  See 
David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Decide Who Can Release Guantánamo Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2009 (referencing letter from Obama Solicitor General Elena Kagan explaining 
that the administration had already found homes for all but one of the petitioners).  Mo-
rever, when announcing its decision to prosecute ten high profile Guantánamo detainees 
in civilian court and military commissions outside of Guantánamo, Obama Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder claimed the administration was taking a significant step forward in its ef-
forts to close Guantánamo.  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civil-
ian Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.  Of course, it is theoretically 
possible that some other plaintiff held at Guantánamo—assuming Guantánamo remains 
open—might bring a similar claim in the near future.  See Posting of Lyle Denniston to 
SCOTUSblog, Update on Kiyemba Case, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/update-on-
kiyemba-case/ (Sept. 24, 2009, 17:15 EST). 
 20 Dellinger, supra note 1. 
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My argument will proceed in three parts.  First, I will argue that 
Bush-era enemy combatant decisions were anything but counter-
majoritarian.  These decisions tracked larger social and political 
forces.  These decisions, moreover, were hugely popular with news-
papers, academics, and other elite audiences (audiences that matter a 
great deal to centrist Justices).  Second, contrary to media and aca-
demic portrayals of these cases as bold, decisive, and consequential, 
Bush-era decisions were truly incremental.  The 2004 and 2006 deci-
sions placed few meaningful demands on the administration; Boume-
diene was decided at a moment in time when the Court had good rea-
son to think that the political process was well on its way to closing 
Guantánamo (so that constitutionally mandated habeas hearings 
would be symbolically consequential but of little practical import).  
Third, I will extend my analysis of Bush-era cases to the Obama era.  
In particular, I will explain why today’s Court has no institutional in-
centive to place meaningful limits on Obama administration policy-
making.  Even though the Court may rule against the government in 
Kiyemba, there is no reason to think that it will check the President in 
ways that will severely constrain elected branch priorities (priorities, 
incidentally, that include the closing of Guantánamo and the imposi-
tion of some rule of law norms in detainee cases).21  In making this 
point, I will draw a fairly obvious connection between Bush admini-
stration missteps in advancing an overly aggressive view of inherent 
presidential war-making power and the Court’s efforts to expand 
power by speaking loudly but, ultimately, asking for very little. 
I.  THE ENEMY COMBATANT DECISIONS:  SIGNS OF THE TIMES 
Supreme Court enemy combatant decisions very much track lar-
ger social and political forces.  First, the Bush administration over-
played its hand—harming itself with the American people as well as 
media and academic elites.  Second, separate and apart from legal 
arguments, the administration did great damage to itself through its 
 
 21 Indeed, given Obama administration opposition to Bush-era policies (including the nom-
ination of vociferous Bush critics to high-ranking Justice Department positions), it may be 
the case that the administration would quietly welcome a Court ruling that would be seen 
as another rebuke to the Bush Justice Department.  Indeed, the Obama administration’s 
decision to try key Al Qaeda figures in federal civilian court was widely depicted as a 
“symbolic break with the most controversial policies of President George W. Bush.”  Bar-
ton Gellman, 9/11 Trial Could Become a Parable of Right and Wrong, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 
2009, at A1.  For a discussion of how it is that the government sometimes welcomes judi-
cial invalidations of disfavored policies, see Neal Devins, Is Judicial Policymaking Counterma-
joritarian?, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW:  AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 189 (Mark C. 
Miller & Jeb Barnes eds. 2004).  For additional discussion, see infra note 182. 
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mishandling of the war on terror, Hurricane Katrina, and much 
more.  Third, Congress, while authorizing military tribunals and the 
suspension of habeas corpus, nonetheless signaled to the Court that 
it would support anti-administration rulings. 
This Part will explain how Court decisions in 2004, 2006, and 2008 
track larger social and political forces.  In so doing, I think it impor-
tant to note at the outset that the social and political forces surround-
ing Supreme Court enemy combatant decisions were dynamic.  When 
the Supreme Court decided Boumediene, for example, the tide of pub-
lic and elite opinion against the administration had peaked.22  Relat-
edly, the Republican Congress that had enacted the Military Commis-
sion Act (MCA) had been replaced by a Democratic Congress that 
did not support the habeas-stripping provisions in the MCA.23  How-
ever, when the Court first entered this fray in 2004, there was no rea-
son to think that the Republican Congress or the American people 
would support a sweeping denunciation of administration policies.  
For this very reason, it is critically important to track the trajectory of 
anti-administration Supreme Court decision making with changes in 
public, elite, and lawmaker opinion.  In this Part, I will highlight aca-
demic, media, public, and lawmaker opinion—showing that Court 
decisions were not out-of-step with prevailing social and political 
forces.  In Part II, I will highlight the incremental nature of Court de-
cision making, showing that the Court initially gave Congress and the 
President significant breathing room to advance their preferred poli-
cies.24 
A.  Justices and Their Audiences25 
Supreme Court decision making rarely deviates from dominant 
social and political forces.26  Nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate, Supreme Court Justices are part of the social 
 
 22 See infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text (discussing dozens of job rating polls which 
indicate disapproval of President Bush). 
 23 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 123–34 and accompanying text. 
 25 The title to this subpart plays off of LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES:  A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).  The analysis in this subsection generally 
tracks Baum’s book. 
 26 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); cf. NEAL 
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3–5 (2004) (noting that “Jus-
tices pay attention to public opinion when crafting their decisions”). 
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and political forces at the time of their nomination.27  Lacking the 
power of the purse and the sword, moreover, the Court is well aware 
of its need to enlist elected officials to implement its decisions.28  Fi-
nally, judges—like other people—care about the “esteem of other 
people.”29  “[O]verwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and ex-
tremely well educated, usually at the nation’s more elite universities,” 
economic and social leaders’ views matter more to the Court than to 
popularly elected lawmakers (who must appeal to popular sentiment 
in order to win elections).30  In particular, since the Justices’ reputa-
tions are shaped by the media, law professors, lawyers groups, and 
other judges and justices, they maximize their status by taking opin-
ions of the elite into account.31 
Supreme Court enemy combatant rulings track this familiar pat-
tern.  The administration and its legal arguments were held in disre-
pute—initially by academics and other elites, but increasingly by vot-
ers and members of Congress.  The result of all this was a Supreme 
 
 27 Political scientists who subscribe to the attitudinal model contend that Supreme Court 
Justices simply vote their policy preferences—but that the appointments and confirma-
tion process ensures that their policy preferences generally conform with elected gov-
ernment preferences.  See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (noting that the attitudinal model 
“holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis 
the ideological attitudes and values of the justices”). 
 28 Proponents of strategic models of judicial decision making argue that Supreme Court 
Justices take into account the likely reactions of elected officials to advance their policy 
and/or legal agenda.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE xiii 
(1998) (“[J]ustices may be primarily seekers of legal policy . . . . [J]ustices are strategic ac-
tors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the 
preferences of others . . . and of the institutional context in which they act.”); Howard 
Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building, (or a Game):  Interpretive Institutionalism and the 
Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISON-MAKING:  NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
 29 BAUM, supra note 25, at 32–33 (explaining why judges are likely to have “an especially 
strong interest in the esteem of other people”). 
 30 Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189 
(1998). 
 31 See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behav-
ior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627–30 (2000) (indicating the possibility that “Justices . . . have 
a desire to conform their attitudes to the attitudes of the social and professional circles in 
which they travel, and thus to the attitudes of the intellectual elite in general”); see also 
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American 
People, 98 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2010).  On the issue of military tribunals, there was a 
striking disjunction between elite views (wildly opposed) and public opinion (strongly in 
favor) on President Bush’s 2002 proposal to make use of military commissions.  See Jack 
Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:  What a Difference Sixty 
Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 271–74 (2002) (noting that Congress reacted in 
vehement, and sometimes strident, opposition to President Bush’s Order to establish 
Military Commissions).  For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
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Court more and more willing to impose checks on presidential war 
making.  In the balance of this Part, and throughout this Essay, I will 
call attention to the ways in which the Court’s enemy combatant cases 
are attentive to social and political forces. 
To start, the Bush administration staked out counter-productive 
hard line positions.  Uninterested in narrow, technical victories, the 
administration sought to negate any judicial role in policing presi-
dential war making.  Consider, for example, 2004 arguments made by 
the administration in Rasul v. Bush—where the Court took up the 
threshold question of whether to recognize federal court jurisdiction 
over Guantánamo Bay (a military base that the United States leased 
from Cuba).  Rather than limit itself to the propriety of the Court rul-
ing on the legal rights of detainees captured abroad and held at 
Guantánamo, the administration claimed that “[t]he Constitution 
commits to the political branches and, in particular, the President, 
the responsibility for conducting the Nation’s foreign affairs and mili-
tary operations.”32  The government, moreover, warned the Court 
that “[e]xercising jurisdiction” over Guantánamo detainees would 
“strike a serious blow” to the war effort by placing the judiciary in the 
“unprecedented position of micromanaging the Executive’s handling 
of captured enemy combatants.”33  The Bush administration sounded 
a similar note in another 2004 case—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld—concerning 
the government’s power to detain American citizens.34  Noting both 
that “the responsibility for waging war is [constitutionally] committed 
to the political branches” and that the “President, as Commander in 
Chief, has the authority to capture and detain enemy combatants [in-
cluding American citizens] for the duration of hostilities,”35 the ad-
ministration made clear that neither the courts nor Congress could 
police presidential war making.  The fact that Congress had enacted 
legislation that may well have authorized the presidential initiative 
did not matter; the Bush administration made unilateral presidential 
authority the focus of their argument.36 
 
 32 Brief for the Respondents at 15–16, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334 & 03-
343). 
 33 Id. at 16. 
 34 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 35 Brief for the Respondents at 9, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696). 
 36 The administration brief did note that their action was statutorily authorized—but did so 
as a backup argument to the primary argument of inherent presidential authority.  See id. 
at 21–22.  The government also cautioned against judicial micromanagement in a third 
2004 case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla (also involving the detention of an American citizen).  See 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 463 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he 
Government purports to exercise complete control, free from judicial surveillance”). 
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The Supreme Court ruled against the Bush administration in 
2004, holding that “a state of war is not a blank check for the Presi-
dent” and that the Constitution “most assuredly envisions a role for 
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”37  Unde-
terred, the Bush administration continued to aggressively advance a 
sweeping vision of presidential war making power in subsequent cas-
es.  In 2006, the government argued in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the 
President had inherent authority to establish military tribunals and 
that the decision of whether the Geneva Conventions apply to enemy 
combatants is “solely for the Executive.”38  At a minimum, “[e]ven if 
some judicial review of the President’s determination were appropri-
ate . . . the standard of review would surely be extraordinarily defer-
ential to the President.”39 
In 2008, after the Court rejected its inherent authority claim in 
Hamdan, the Bush administration continued to make the broadest 
arguments available.  In defending its military tribunal system and, 
with it, the Military Commission Act, the administration contended 
both that “aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States” do not enjoy any habeas protections, and that Guantánamo 
Bay was outside the sovereign territory of the U.S. (a notion that the 
Court had seemingly rejected in Rasul).40  By this time, however, the 
administration’s legal arguments had been overwhelmingly rebuked 
by law professors, historians, and the media—not just left-leaning 
academics and newspapers but also by a broad cross-section that in-
cluded leading conservative academics and journalists. 
Amicus filings before the Supreme Court are especially instructive 
here.  Two hundred amicus briefs were filed in enemy combatant 
cases—many by the very types of individuals and groups that judges 
care most about.41  Over the course of the litigation, academics as well 
as professional organizations, including bar groups and former fed-
eral judges, filed scores of briefs defending the Court’s power to 
check presidential war making.  And while some amici backed the 
administration, their numbers diminished over time—so that the ra-
tio of anti- to pro-administration briefs became more and more lop-
 
 37 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
 38 Brief for Respondents at 38, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184). 
 39 Id.  The government did not simply rely on these broad claims of power.  It also argued 
that Congress had authorized military commissions, and that the language of the Geneva 
Convention suggested that it did not apply to Al Qaeda.  Id. at 15–20, 38. 
 40 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 12, 23, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 
(2008) (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196). 
 41 See BAUM, supra note 25, at 77–78 (discussing the factors important to judges in their rul-
ings); see also Baum & Devins, supra note 31. 
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sided.  In Hamdi and Rasul, the ratio of anti- to pro-administration 
briefs was two to one and three to one, respectively.42  Hamdan and 
Boumediene had respectively a seven to one and six to one ratio.43  Op-
position to the administration, moreover, was not limited to the aca-
demic left or left-leaning interest groups.  The Cato Institute and 
Rutherford Foundation, for example, filed briefs against the admini-
stration in many of these cases.44  Briefs were also filed by bar groups, 
formal federal judges (some of whom were Republican appointees), 
and members of the United Kingdom and European Union parlia-
ments (175 signatories in Rasul, and 422 signatories in Hamdan).45 
A closer look at academic briefs provides a revealing look at grow-
ing opposition to Bush administration arguments.  In Rasul, while the 
overwhelming number of academic briefs rejected administration ar-
guments, a distinguished group of academics—including John 
McGinnis and Abraham Sofaer—filed a brief in support of the ad-
ministration.46  In sharp contrast, no academics filed briefs in support 
of the administration in either Hamdan or Boumediene.  In Hamdan, a 
staggering sixteen briefs were filed by groups of historians and law 
professors (including briefs by military historians and international 
law professors).47  Some of these briefs featured high profile conserva-
 
 42 Memorandum from Nick Miller to Neal Devins (March 3, 2009) (on file with author). 
 43 Id.; see also infra notes 170–72 and accompanying text (discussing the al Marri litigation 
that commenced with President Bush, but was mooted by the actions of the Obama ad-
ministration). 
 44 See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene, 128 
S. Ct. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196); Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); Brief of The 
American Jewish Committee et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 548 
U.S. 557 (No. 05-184); Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 45 See Amicus Curiae Brief of 422 Current and Former Members of the United Kingdom and 
European Union Parliaments in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-
184); Brief of Amici Curiae Certain Former Federal Judges in Support of Petitioner, 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and 
Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Former Federal Judges Shirley M. Hufstedler and Wil-
liam A. Norris in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184); Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones et al. 
in Support of Petitioners, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); Brief of 175 Members of 
Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2003) 
(Nos. 03-343 & 03-334). 
 46 Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors et al. in Support of Respondents at 2–3, Rasul, 542 
U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343) (stating that the bright line rule limiting the “statutory 
remedy of habeas corpus to matters affecting American citizens and matters occurring on 
American sovereign territory” should not be overthrown). 
 47 Brief for Richard A. Epstein et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Hamdan, 
548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184) (citing four law professors who joined the brief in support of 
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tives (such as Richard A. Epstein and Randy E. Barnett) and indi-
viduals who had earlier sided with the government (such as Abraham 
Sofaer).48 
Academics, including leading conservatives, expressed their dis-
approval with the administration in other ways.  Law review commen-
tary typically backed the Court (or suggested that the Court should 
have gone even further in rejecting the administration).  Based on a 
search of articles on Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene, my re-
search assistant identified thirty-one articles that backed the Court’s 
position, and seven that backed that of the administration.49  More 
striking, conservative academics John McGinnis (who signed the pro-
Bush Rasul brief ) and Jack Goldsmith (who headed the Office of Le-
gal Counsel from October 2003 to June 2004) openly questioned the 
administration’s legal tactics.  In the wake of the Court’s Hamdan rul-
ing, McGinnis wrote that “[f]ar from strengthening executive power, 
the administration’s policies generated a series of Supreme Court de-
feats that have weakened it.”50  Goldsmith likewise attacked the ad-
ministration’s “go-it-alone” view of executive power.  “They embraced 
this vision,” he said, “because they wanted to leave the presidency 
stronger than when they assumed office, but the approach they took 
achieved exactly the opposite effect.  The central irony is that people 
whose explicit goal was to expand presidential power have dimin-
ished it.”51 
Administration legal arguments were also savaged in a slew of 
books as well as newspaper editorials backing the Supreme Court de-
cision making.  Nearly all books about the administration’s enemy 
combatant campaign were highly critical of administration unilateral-
ism.  These included books by left-leaning journalists such as Charlie 
 
petitioner and argued that the “Constitution will serve as an enduring charter of govern-
ment only if all branches of government act in accordance with its central principles”). 
 48 See id. at 1; Brief of Amici Curiae Certain Former Federal Judges in Support of Petitioner 
at 1, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184). The legal issue raised in Hamdan was, of course, 
fundamentally different than the legal issue raised in Rasul.  At the same time, by shifting 
sides and signing the Hamdan brief, Judge Sofaer knowingly and publicly signaled his dis-
agreement with the administration. 
 49 See Memorandum from Ryan Millett to Neal Devins (July 15, 2009) (on file with author). 
 50 John O. McGinnis, Executive Power in The War on Terror, POL’Y REV. Dec. 2007–Jan. 2008 
63, 64–65. 
 51 See Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 
40 (discussing Goldsmith’s view in The Terror Presidency that the Bush administration went 
about answering questions regarding the legal limits of executive power in the wrong 
way); see also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 29–42 (2007) (detailing the fights 
Goldsmith had against the expansive view of executive power championed by the White 
House). 
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Savage (who wrote Takeover:  The Return of the Imperial Presidency and 
the Subversion of American Democracy)52 and Jane Mayer (The Dark Side:  
The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American 
Ideals).53  But the administration was also subject to criticism from 
moderates and conservatives.  For example, in books that otherwise 
advanced either a robust view of presidential power (Jack Goldsmith’s 
The Terror Presidency)54 or a narrow view of judicial authority (Benja-
min Wittes’ Law and the Long War:  The Future of Justice in the Age of Ter-
ror),55 the administration was criticized for only asking Congress to 
create new laws after its claims of presidential unilateralism were re-
jected. 
Newspaper editorials are even more revealing.  Over the course of 
its legal campaign over enemy combatants, the administration had 
next to no defenders among leading newspapers.  I surveyed fifteen 
top newspapers (Los Angeles Times, San Diego Union, San Francisco Ex-
aminer, New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, Dallas Morn-
ing News, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Miami Herald, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Chicago 
Tribune, and Philadelphia Inquirer).  Most, but not all, of these have 
left-leaning reputations.  With the exception of the Wall Street Jour-
nal,56 however, all of these papers either criticized the administra-
tion’s handling of Guantánamo,57 called for the Supreme Court to re-
 
 52 CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER:  THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007). 
 53 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED 
INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
 54 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 28 (agreeing with and supporting the “President’s general 
wartime authority to detain enemy combatants and try them by military commission”). 
 55 BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR:  THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF 
TERROR 103–04 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he risks of a big judicial footprint in the war on 
terrorism are significant”). 
 56 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Editorial, Citizen Hamdi, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at A14 (de-
scribing the decision as a potentially “positive development”). 
 57 See The American Way:  Guantánamo Detainees Deserve Day in Court, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., 
Dec. 8, 2007, at B6; Ben Ehrenreich, Not on Our Best Behavior:  Former Detainees from the War 
on Terrorism are Speaking Out, Claiming Abuse by the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at M3; 
Martha Ezzard, Editorial, Detainees Entitled to Be Heard, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 16, 2003, 
at A15; James O. Goldsborough, Abandoning Human Rights Principles, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 20, 2003, at B7; Nat Hentoff, Eroding Detainees Rights:  Administration Shows Dis-
regard for Prisoners’ Attorneys, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at A19; Melissa Hoffer, Editorial, 
Trapped at Guantánamo, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2007, at A11; Clarence Page, Editorial, 
Rights Matter in Circus Trials, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2002, at N23; Six Years, No Charges, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 4, 2007, at 10A; Avi Stadler & John Chandler, Look to Israel to Learn How to 
Handle Guantánamo Detainees, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 21, 2007, at B1. 
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ject the Bush administration’s legal arguments,58 or applauded the 
Supreme Court for ruling against the administration.59 
Against this backdrop, it is hard to describe Supreme Court en-
emy combatant rulings as truly counter-majoritarian.  With each 
round of decisions, the Supreme Court understood that its decisions 
reflected the views of newspapers, academics, bar groups, the interna-
tional community, and many others.  More than that, conservatives 
became increasingly frustrated with the administration’s hard line 
positions—so that opposition to the administration came from the 
right as well as the left. 
B.  Bush, the American People, and Congress 
Separate and apart from its legal arguments, the Court’s willing-
ness to check the administration was facilitated by other administra-
tion missteps—some but not all of which were tied to its running of 
the war on terror.  Over time, these missteps resulted in the Ameri-
can people losing confidence in the President.  For its part, the 2001–
2006 Republican Congress initially backed the President while simul-
taneously signaling to the Court that it would support judicial invali-
dations of the President’s enemy combatant initiative.  Needless to 
say, the 2007–2008 Democratic Congress (whose election was very 
much tied to voter disapproval of the President) strongly supported 
anti-administration Court rulings. 
In the next part of this Essay, I will link growing dissatisfaction 
with the administration to the types of restrictions that the Court 
placed on the administration.  For the balance of this section, I will 
highlight how majoritarian forces (public and legislative opinion) 
never stood as a roadblock to the Court placing some limits on presi-
dential power.  Indeed, by the time that the Court issued its Boumedi-
ene decision, the American people and Congress strongly disapproved 
of the President. 
 
 58 Robert Barnes, Justices Weigh Courts’ Role in Detainee Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at 
A20; David Bowker & David Kaye, Guantánamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, 
at A15; James Carroll, Guantánamo’s Day in Court, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2008, at A11; 
Editorial, ‘Enemy Combatants’ in Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2004, at A18; Anthony Lewis, 
In Times of War, Courts Can and Do Abdicate Their Function, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Feb. 26, 2003, at B7; Anthony Lewis, The Justices Take on the President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2004, at A21; Editorial, War vs. Rights:  Bush Bends, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 4, 2003, 
at 8. 
 59 Editorial, A Strong Stand Against U.S. Detention Policy, MIAMI HERALD, June 15, 2008, at L4; 
Doug Cassel, ‘Enemy Combatants’ Get Their Day in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2004, at 15; 
Editorial, Tools of Shame:  Supreme Court Blots a Stain, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 13, 2008, at 
A22. 
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Public Opinion.60 In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks, President Bush’s approval rating stood at 90%, “the 
highest Gallup has ever measured for a president.”61  In 2002, the 
public supported President Bush’s military commission initiative by 
more than a two to one margin.62  Up until the March 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, the President’s approval ratings remained strong (averaging 
around 70% throughout this period).63  By 2004, however, the Presi-
dent’s approval rating fell below 50% for the first time.64  At that time, 
the nation was split on the President’s handling of the war on terror.  
One poll (taken just before the Hamdi and Rasul cases were argued) 
found that 56% of Americans thought that the United States was do-
ing all it reasonably could do to prevent terrorism.65  Another poll 
found that 46% of Americans thought the President was doing a 
“good” job handling the war on terror, and 47% thought he was do-
ing a “poor” job.66 
Two years later (around the time of the Hamdan decision), ap-
proval ratings for the President hovered around 40% that year,67 and 
a CBS-New York Times opinion poll reported that Bush’s approval rat-
ing had sunk to a historic low of 31% in May 2006 (one month before 
 
 60 For reasons Larry Baum and I have detailed elsewhere, there is little reason to think that 
public opinion directly influences Supreme Court decision making.  See Baum & Devins, 
supra note 31.  At the same time, public opinion indirectly influences Court decision mak-
ing in two important ways.  First, public opinion has an impact on which party controls 
the White House and Congress; correspondingly, to the extent that the Court is shaped 
by elected government decision making, public opinion indirectly influences Court deci-
sion making.  See id.  Second, public opinion (along with elite opinion, elected govern-
ment decision making, and much more) helps shape prevailing social norms—norms 
which may influence judicial decision making.  See id. 
 61 Jeffrey M. Jones, Despite Recent Lows, Bush Approval Average is Midrange, GALLUP, Jan. 5, 
2009, http://gallup.com/poll/113641/Despite-Recent-Lows-Bush-Approval-Average-
Midrange.aspx. 
 62 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 271 (describing how the public reaction to 
President Bush’s establishment of Military Commissions differed from the public reaction 
to Roosevelt’s). 
 63 See Jones, supra note 61 (detailing President George W. Bush’s job approval ratings dur-
ing various periods of his presidency). 
 64 See Kerry Leads Bush in New Poll, CNN, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
ALLPOLITICS/02/02/elec04.poll.prez/ (describing how, at the time of the article’s pub-
lication, Senator John Kerry, the Democratic presidential nominee, was leading President 
Bush according to a newly released poll). 
 65 ABC NEWS, ABC NEWS POLL OF SEPT. 5–7, 2006, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/terror3.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 66 See TIME/CNN, TIME/CNN POLL OF MAY 12–13, 2004, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/terror6.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (detailing the re-
sults of the poll). 
 67 See infra note 69 (showing President George W. Bush’s overall job ratings in a variety of 
national polls on various dates). 
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the ruling).68  At that time, 55% of Americans disapproved of the ad-
ministration’s handling of the war on terror,69 and only 38% of 
Americans thought the United States was doing all it could to prevent 
terrorism.70  In 2008, Bush’s approval rating dropped to a historic low 
of 24%.71 
The sharp decline in President Bush’s approval ratings spurred on 
a corresponding decline in public attitudes towards the executive 
branch.  Trust in the executive dropped below 50% for the last three 
years of the Bush presidency.  In 2008, “[j]ust 42% of Americans 
sa[id] they ha[d] a great deal or fair amount of trust in the executive 
branch . . . the lowest [reading] since a 40% [Watergate-era] reading 
in April 1974.”72  Likewise, public attitudes towards “the way the na-
tion is being governed” dropped dramatically during the last four 
years of the Bush presidency—from 56% in 2003, to 49% in 2004, to 
41% in 2006, and to 26% in 2008.73 
Administration Missteps.  The precipitous decline in President 
Bush’s popularity over the course of the enemy combatant litigation 
corresponds to a series of policy-making missteps by the administra-
tion.74  Court rulings in 2004 occurred in the backdrop of the Abu 
Ghraib prison abuse scandal and the conflagration over the Justice 
Department’s torture memo.  Indeed, on the very day that the Court 
heard oral arguments in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the media released pho-
tographs of U.S. soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib.75  
Making matters worse, the administration had argued in Court on 
that very day that the “last thing you want to do is torture somebody 
 
 68 See Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, Poll Gives Bush Worst Marks Yet on Major Issues, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2006, at A1 (describing public perceptions of President George W. Bush 
and the Republican party over major issues). 
 69 POLLINGREPORT.COM, PRESIDENT BUSH—OVERALL JOB RATING, http:// 
www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (indicating public opin-
ion of President George W. Bush on various survey days). 
 70 See ABC NEWS, supra note 65. 
 71 See POLLINGREPORT.COM, supra note 69 (showing public perception of President George 
W. Bush on various survey days). 
 72 Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Government Remains Low, GALLUP, Sept. 18, 2008, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/110458/Trust-Government-Remains-Low.aspx. 
 73 See id. (describing how the public’s confidence in U.S. government institutions has con-
tinued to decline). 
 74 These missteps contributed to public opinion, media coverage, academic commentary, 
elections and elected government action, and prevailing social norms.  All of these factors 
either directly or indirectly contributed to the Court’s decision making.  See also Baum & 
Devins, supra note 31 (identifying different ways that social and political forces may con-
tribute to Supreme Court decision making). 
 75 See Charles Lane, Iraq Prison Abuse May Hurt Administration in Court, WASH. POST, May 13, 
2004, at A22 (explaining how abuse of terrorism detainees at Guantánamo may undercut 
the rationale for anti-terrorism policies). 
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or try to do something along those lines.”76  Six weeks later, the press 
revealed that the Justice Department had crafted a legal justification 
to use torture during the interrogation of suspected terrorists and 
that U.S. military officers in Iraq modeled their interrogation proce-
dures after tactics used at Guantánamo.77 
Administration missteps may have also contributed to the Court’s 
2006 ruling in Hamdan.  In the winter and spring of 2006—when the 
Court was crafting its opinion in Hamdan—the administration’s han-
dling of Hurricane Katrina and the War in Iraq, among other things, 
contributed to ever-increasing voter disapproval of President Bush.78  
By the time of the Court’s ruling in Hamdan, moreover, the crisis at-
mosphere following the September 11 attacks had abated.  For this 
reason, increasing skepticism greeted claims of inherent presidential 
authority to both detain enemy combatants and to make use of a mili-
tary commission system.79 
By March 2007, when certiorari petitions had been filed in Boume-
diene, Democrats had seized control of both houses of Congress.  Peti-
tioners in Boumediene, however, were not successful in capitalizing on 
Bush administration policy failures.  On April 2, 2007, the Court 
turned their petition down—calling for petitioners to exhaust all 
available remedies or, alternatively, come forward with evidence that 
the government had “unreasonably delayed [enemy combatant] pro-
ceedings” or otherwise acted improperly.80  But two months later, the 
Court reversed course and agreed to hear Boumediene’s challenge to 
the Military Commission Act.81 
 
 76 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696). 
 77 See Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn’t Bind Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A1 (explaining why lawyers determined that the President was not 
bound by bans on torture); Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use 
of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1 (explaining how, according to the Justice De-
partment, arguments such as necessity and self-defense could justify the torture of Al 
Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad and eliminate any criminal liability later). 
 78 See Michael A. Fletcher, President May Be Running Out of Time to Rebound, WASH. POST, Apr. 
9, 2006, at A6 (indicating that President George W. Bush’s approval ratings were at an all-
time low). 
 79 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context:  The Inevitability 
of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1075–76 (2007) (describing why 
the Supreme Court, despite a history of judicial deference to presidential determinations 
regarding security in times of war, agreed to hear Hamdan and ruled against the U.S. 
President). 
 80 See Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (providing further information re-
garding why the Supreme Court chose to deny the petitions). 
 81 Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007) (indicating that the petition for rehearing was 
granted). 
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The precipitating event:  The filing of a declaration by Lieutenant 
Colonel Stephen Abraham about hearings in which the military de-
termines whether a detainee should be held indefinitely as an enemy 
combatant.82  Abraham, who had participated as a hearing officer in 
this process, claimed that the process was fundamentally flawed with 
considerable pressure from commanders for officers participating in 
hearings to rubber-stamp their decisions.83  Along with this declara-
tion, the Justices also became aware—through widespread media 
coverage—of suicides and suicide attempts by Guantánamo detain-
ees.84  By June 2008, when the Court issued its ruling in Boumediene, 
the administration had suffered additional policy embarrassments.  
In particular, Barack Obama and John McCain both pledged to close 
Guantánamo and, more tellingly, both campaigns called for change 
from the fundamentally flawed policies of the Bush administration. 
Congress, the President, and the Court.  Throughout the enemy com-
batant litigation, Congress signaled to the Court that it would go 
along with whatever ruling the Court made in these cases.  In other 
words, contrary to the portrayal by academics and the news media of 
the Supreme Court’s willingness to stand up to Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch, lawmakers repeatedly stood behind Court rulings lim-
iting elected branch power.  At the same time, as I will detail in the 
next Part, the Court pursued an incremental strategy—declining to 
test the boundaries of lawmaker acquiescence and, instead, issuing 
decisions that it knew would be acceptable to lawmakers.85 
The 2004 rulings in Hamdi and Rasul triggered anything but a 
backlash.  In the days following the decisions, no lawmaker spoke on 
the House or Senate floor about the decision, and only a handful is-
 
 82 See William Glaberson, Military Insider Becomes Critic of Hearings at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2007, at A1 (detailing the role of Colonel Abraham, the first military insider to 
criticize publicly the hearings to determine whether Guantánamo detainees may be held 
indefinitely as enemy combatants, in the Guantánamo hearings).  In Part II, I will detail 
why the Court’s initial decision to deny certiorari and its subsequent about-face typify the 
Court’s incremental approach to the enemy combatant issue.  See infra Part II. 
 83 See generally Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Appendix to Reply to Opposition to Peti-
tion for Rehearing, Al Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. June 22, 2007) (describ-
ing his experience participating on a Combatant Status Review Tribunal).  Abraham also 
noted that hearings relied on evidence that lacked specificity and that exculpatory infor-
mation about the detainees was unavailable and possibly withheld.  Id. 
 84 See William Glaberson, Detainee Found Dead in Guantánamo Cell, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, 
at A15 (describing how an unidentified Guantánamo detainee had committed suicide); 
Josh White, Death of Guantánamo Detainee is Apparent Suicide, Military Says, WASH. POST, 
May 31, 2007, at A8 (providing details regarding the death of a Saudi detainee at Guan-
tánamo). 
 85 See infra Part II (detailing how the Supreme Court’s incremental approach to enemy 
combatant litigation helped to ensure acceptance of the Court’s decisions by lawmakers). 
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sued press releases about the cases.86  And while eight members of 
Congress signed onto amicus briefs backing administration policy,87 
Congress did not seriously pursue legislative reform on this issue until 
the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the Hamdan case.88 
When Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) in 
December 2005, “lawmakers made clear that they did not see the 
DTA as an attack on either the Court or an independent judiciary.”89  
Most significant, even though the DTA placed limits on federal court 
consideration of enemy combatant habeas petitions, lawmakers nev-
ertheless anticipated that the Supreme Court would decide the fate 
of the President’s military tribunal initiative.  Lawmakers deleted lan-
guage in the original bill precluding federal court review of Hamdan 
and other pending cases.90  Lawmakers, moreover, depicted them-
selves as working collegially with the Court; several Senators, for ex-
ample, contended that the “Supreme Court has been shouting to us 
in Congress:  Get involved,”91 and thereby depicted Rasul as a chal-
 
 86 See Press Release, Congresswoman Jane Harman, Harman Welcomes Decision by Su-
preme Court to Provide Detainees with Access to Courts and Counsel (June 28, 2004), 
http://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2004/062804PR_SupremeCourt.html 
(indicating Harman’s support for the Supreme Court’s ruling that Guantánamo Bay de-
tainees are legally entitled to challenge their detention in courts and obtain counsel); 
Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch on Guantánamo Bay Supreme Court Decision 
(June 28, 2004), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Print&PressRelease_id=19b60330-4863-4fcc-9023-08ccb87ac21f&suppresslayouts=true 
(expressing concern that the Supreme Court’s decision to allow Guantánamo Bay detain-
ees access to the United States court system could hamper the war on terrorism). 
 87 See Brief of the Center for American Unity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (urging affirmation of the lower 
court’s decision in support of the administration); Brief for United States Senators John 
Cornyn and Larry E. Craig as Amicus Curiae in Support of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Rums-
feld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) and Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696) 
(indicating that Senators Cornyn and Craig support the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force joint resolution and their belief that the resolution provides authorization for the 
detainment of two American citizens as enemy combatants). 
 88 Congressional debates on the Detainee Treatment Act began three days after the grant-
ing of certiorari in Hamdan; the bill, however, had been filed before the certiorari grant.  
See 151 CONG. REC. S14,263–64 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (discuss-
ing a bill that would potentially strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear claims 
from detainees held in Guantánamo Bay). 
 89 The balance of this paragraph is drawn from Neal Devins, Congress, the Supreme Court, and 
Enemy Combatants:  How Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal 
Court Jurisdiction, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1562, 1572–73 (2007) (detailing the ways in which 
Congress sought to convey that they did not view the DTA as attacking the Supreme 
Court or an independent judiciary). 
 90 For additional discussion, see id. at 1570–72 (explaining why Congress did not believe its 
jurisdiction-stripping statutes challenged the Supreme Court’s power). 
 91 151 CONG. REC. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
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lenge to Congress,92 “asking the Senate and the House, do you intend 
for . . . enemy combatants . . . to challenge their detention [in federal 
courts] as if they were American citizens?”93  Lawmakers also spoke of 
detainee habeas petitions as an “abuse[]”94 of the federal courts, and 
warned that such petitions might unduly clog the courts,95 thus 
“swamping the system”96 with frivolous complaints.97  Under this view, 
the DTA’s cabining of federal court jurisdiction “respect[s]” the 
Court’s independence and its role in the detainee process.98 
Following Hamdan, lawmakers likewise did not challenge the 
Court’s conclusions that the DTA did not retrospectively bar the 
Hamdan litigation and that the President could not unilaterally pur-
sue his military tribunal policy.99  Even though the Military Commis-
sions Act (MCA) eliminates federal court jurisdiction over enemy 
combatant habeas petitions, lawmakers depicted themselves as work-
ing in tandem with the Court.  Representative Duncan Hunter (R. 
Cal.), who introduced the legislation on the House floor, said during 
the debates that the bill was a response to the “mandate of the Su-
preme Court that Congress involve itself in producing this new struc-
ture to prosecute terrorists.”100  And DTA sponsor Lindsey Graham 
stated:  “The Supreme Court has set the rules of the road and the 
 
 92 See 151 CONG. REC. S12,753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (ex-
plaining why the Rasul case should be viewed as a challenge to Congress). 
 93 See id. at S12,732; see also 151 CONG. REC. S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Specter) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court finally took the bull by the 
horns . . . because the Congress had not acted”); id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting that 
Rasul was a statutory ruling and, consequently, that Congress could clarify its intent with-
out contradicting the Court).  Senators similarly characterized Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi 
opinion as an invitation for Congress to narrow detainee rights legislatively.  See id. at 
S12,656 (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 94 See 151 CONG. REC. S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (pro-
viding multiple examples of how detainees are abusing the federal courts with their ha-
beas petitions). 
 95 See 151 CONG. REC. S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (describing 
how detainee habeas corpus petitions burden the federal courts). 
 96 See 151 CONG. REC. S12,732 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (ex-
pressing concern that “Americans are losing their day in court because somehow we have 
allowed enemy combatants, people who have signed up to kill us all, to take us into Fed-
eral court and sue us about everything”). 
 97 See 151 CONG. REC. S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (argu-
ing that his amendment was designed to prevent detainees from abusing the federal 
courts by flooding them with frivolous lawsuits). 
 98 See id. at S14,263 (statement of Sen. Graham) (“[W]e wanted to respect the courts’ 
role . . . .”). 
 99 The balance of this paragraph and the following paragraph are drawn from Devins, supra 
note 89, at 1574–78 (describing the reaction of lawmakers to the Court’s ruling in Ham-
dan). 
100 152 CONG. REC. H7535 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hunter). 
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Congress and the president can drive to the destination together.”101  
Even lawmakers who expressed disappointment in the Court’s ruling 
did not criticize the Court.  Senator Sessions (R. Ala.), for example, 
blamed Hamdan’s lawyers for misleading the Court about the legisla-
tive history of the DTA.102 
Debates over the MCA habeas provision, moreover, reveal that 
lawmakers thought that the Supreme Court was responsible for as-
sessing the reach of habeas protections.  Fifty-one Senators (fifty Re-
publicans and one Democrat) voted against a proposed amendment 
to provide habeas protections to Guantánamo detainees.  Arguing 
that enemy combatants possessed no constitutional habeas rights,103 
these lawmakers contended that they could eliminate habeas claims 
without undermining judicial authority.  One of the principal archi-
tects of the MCA, Senator Lindsey Graham, put it this way:  Enemy 
combatants have “a statutory right of habeas . . . . And if [the Su-
preme Court finds] there is a constitutional right of habeas corpus 
given to enemy combatants, that is . . . totally different . . . and it 
would change in many ways what I have said.”104  Forty-eight Senators 
(forty-three Democrats, four Republicans, and one Independent) ar-
gued that the habeas-stripping provision was unconstitutional, that 
the courts would “clean it up,”105 and that Congress therefore should 
fulfill its responsibility to protect “that great writ.”106 
When the Supreme Court agreed to rule on the constitutionality 
of the MCA, the Congress no longer supported the MCA’s habeas-
stripping provisions.  Democrats had gained control of both Houses 
of Congress.  Not surprisingly, there was next-to-no lawmaker criti-
cism of Boumediene.  In the week following the decision, no member 
 
101 See David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court’s Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations Over Presiden-
tial Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A21; see also Congressional Hearings on Guantánamo 
Set, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-30-
gitmo-hearings_x.htm (quoting Senator John McCain as saying:  “I’m confident that we 
can come up with a framework that guarantees we comply with the Court’s order”). 
102 See 152 CONG. REC. S10,403–04 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions) 
(describing the way in which Hamdan’s lawyers misled the Supreme Court about the leg-
islative history of the DTA). 
103 See Devins, supra note 89, at 1577 (collecting lawmaker comments suggesting that the 
Constitution does not afford habeas protections to enemy combatants). 
104 152 CONG. REC. S10,267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006). 
105 See Paul A. Duller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law:  The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 323 (providing comments made by Senator 
Specter justifying the habeas stripping provision). 
106 See 152 CONG. REC. S10,365–66 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Levin) (rec-
ommending that an amendment be made to the habeas-stripping provision). 
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of the House, and only two Senators, made critical comments about 
the decision on the House or the Senate floor.107 
*  *  * 
Supreme Court enemy combatant decisions were not out-of-step 
with prevailing social and political forces.  Academics (including 
prominent conservatives), the media (again including conservative 
newspapers), former judges, and bar groups had all lined up against 
the administration.  Interest groups too opposed the administration 
(including some conservative groups).  Over the course of the enemy 
combatant litigation, the American people increasingly opposed the 
Bush administration.  This opposition, in part, was tied to policy mis-
steps (some of which implicated enemy combatant policy-making).  
These missteps were highly visible and contributed to widespread op-
position to the Bush administration.  For its part, Congress did not 
question the Court’s role in policing the administration’s enemy 
combatant initiative.  By the time the Court decided Boumediene, voter 
disapproval of the President had translated into widespread opposi-
tion to the administration’s enemy combatant initiative; a Democratic 
Congress supported habeas protections for enemy combatants and 
presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama called for 
the closing of Guantánamo Bay. 
In the next part of this Essay, I will discuss the incremental nature 
of the Court’s decision making.  This discussion will provide addi-
tional support for the claims made in this section.  Specifically, I will 
show that each of the Court’s decisions was in sync with changing atti-
tudes towards the Bush administration.  More than that, Part II will 
belie the myth that Court enemy combatant decisions were especially 
consequential.  Unlike newspaper and academic commentary about 
these cases, Court decision making had only a modest impact.  Corre-
spondingly, the Court never issued a decision that risked its institu-
tional capital; the Court knew that its decisions would be followed by 
elected officials and that its decisions would not ask elected officials 
to take actions that posed some national security risk. 
 
107 See 154 CONG. REC. S5733 (daily ed. June 18, 2008) (remarks of Sen. Cornyn) (criticizing 
the decision by offering it as a recent example of judges imposing their own views into 
their rulings); 154 CONG. REC. S5575 (daily ed. June 12, 2008) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) 
(declaring that he does not believe the Supreme Court ruled correctly in this case).  Dur-
ing this same period, Democrats praised Boumediene.  See id. at S5548–75 (detailing how 
Senators Bingaman, Dorgan, Leahy, and Feinstein made comments on the Senate floor 
supporting the Court’s ruling). 
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II.  JUDICIAL MODESTY OR JUDICIAL HUBRIS:  MAKING SENSE OF THE 
ENEMY COMBATANT CASES 
From 1952 (when the Supreme Court slapped down President 
Truman’s war-time seizure of the steel mills)108 until 2004 (when the 
Court reasserted itself in the first wave of enemy combatant cases), 
the judiciary largely steered clear of war powers disputes.109  In part, 
the Court deferred to presidential desires and expertise.  The Presi-
dent sees the “rights of governance in the foreign affairs and war 
powers areas” as core executive powers.110  Correspondingly, the Pres-
ident has strong incentives to expand his war-making prerogatives.111  
For its part, the Court has limited expertise in this area, and, as such, 
is extremely reluctant to stake out positions that may pose significant 
national security risks.112  The Court, moreover, is extremely reluctant 
to risk elected branch opprobrium.  Lacking the powers of purse and 
sword, the Court cannot ignore the risks of elected branch non-
acquiescence.113 
Against this backdrop, the Court’s repudiation of the Bush ad-
ministration’s enemy combatant initiative appears a dramatic break 
from past practice.  Academic and newspaper commentary back up 
this claim—with these decisions being labeled “stunning” (Harold 
 
108 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the Presi-
dent’s Executive Order directing seizure of steel mills to protect the national defense dur-
ing wartime was unconstitutional). 
109 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case:  One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
63 (2002) (detailing why the modern Supreme Court has generally refrained from ruling 
on constitutional issues regarding wartime power allocation between Congress and the 
President). 
110 See John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers:  
A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 
306 (1993) (describing how the Supreme Court does not have significant interest in ex-
ercising such rights). 
111 See id. (explaining how the Supreme Court has little incentive to become involved in gov-
ernance in foreign affairs and war powers areas); see also Neal Devins, Abdication by Another 
Name:  An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2000) (explaining why 
Presidents have both the incentive and ability to expand war-making power); William Mi-
chael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 
(1997) (detailing Founders’ fears that Presidents would seek fame by expanding their war 
making role). 
112 See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 306 (explaining why the Supreme Court prefers not to be 
involved in issues of foreign affairs and war powers). 
113 See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 28 (providing a detailed explanation of how the Court 
takes potential backlash into account when deciding a case).  For studies suggesting that 
the Court is attentive to the implementation of its decisions, see Tonja Jacobi, How Massa-
chusetts Got Gay Marriage:  The Intersection of Popular Opinion, Legislative Action, and Judicial 
Power, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 219, 225 (2006). 
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Koh),114 “unprecedented” (John Yoo),115 “breathtaking” (Charles 
Krauthammer),116 “astounding” (Neal Katyal),117 “sweeping and cate-
gorical” (New York Times),118 and “historic” (Washington Post and Wall 
Street Journal).119  Upon closer inspection, however, the Court’s deci-
sions are anything but a dramatic break from past practice.  Part I de-
tailed how Court rulings tracked larger social and political forces.  In 
this Part, I will show how the Court risked neither the nation’s secu-
rity nor elected branch non-acquiescence.120  The Court’s initial rul-
ings placed few meaningful checks on the executive; over time, the 
Court—reflecting increasing public disapproval of the President—
imposed additional constraints but never issued a ruling that was out-
of-sync with elected government preferences.  Separate and apart 
from reflecting growing public and elected government disapproval 
of Bush administration policies, the Court had strong incentives to 
intervene in these cases.  The Bush administration had challenged 
the Court’s authority to play any role in national security matters.121  
This frontal assault on judicial power prompted the Court to stand up 
for its authority to “say what the law is.”  In Part III, I will talk about 
the Court’s interest in protecting its turf—especially in cases implicat-
ing individual rights. 
 
114 See Greenberger & Bravin, supra note 3.  For additional discussion, see infra notes 151–55 
and accompanying text. 
115 John Yoo, Op-Ed, The Supreme Court Goes to War, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at A8 (stating 
that the decisions represent “unprecedented expansion into what had always been con-
sidered the ultimate preserve of the political branches”). 
116 Charles Krauthammer, Emergency Over, Saith the Court, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at A17 
(“The court’s wanton overriding of Congress and the president [in Hamdan] is another in 
a long string of breathtaking acts of judicial arrogance.”). 
117 Jonathan Mahler, Why This Court Keeps Rebuking This President, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, 
at WK 3 (quoting Neal Katyal commenting on Boumediene). 
118 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees:  Military Panels 
Found to Lack Authority—New Law Possible, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1 (commenting 
on Hamdan, noting that “[t]he decision was such a sweeping and categorical defeat for 
the administration that it left human rights lawyers . . . almost speechless with surprise 
and delight”).  The New York Times also depicted Boumediene as “categorical in its rejection 
of the administration’s basic arguments.”  Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–4, Back Detainee 
Appeals for Guantánamo:  In a Rebuff to Bush, Court Says Inmates Can Use Habeas Corpus Peti-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, June, 13, 2008, at A1. 
119 See Barnes, supra note 3 (commenting on Boumediene); Greenberger & Bravin, supra note 
3 (same). 
120 For a somewhat analogous argument, see Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1014–15.  Professor 
Pushaw argues that the 2004 and 2006 enemy combatant decisions reflect the Court’s 
penchant to balance national security, executive branch non-acquiescence, and the grav-
ity of the alleged infringement on individual rights. 
121 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
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Small Steps:  Hamdi and Rasul.  These decisions were a minimalist 
opening volley in Court efforts to place judicial limits on the Bush 
administration.  While rejecting claims of executive branch unilater-
alism in national security matters, the Court said next-to-nothing 
about how it would police the President’s enemy combatant initiative.  
Rasul simply held that Guantánamo Bay was a “territory over which 
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control,” and, 
consequently, that the President’s enemy combatant initiative is sub-
ject to existing habeas corpus legislation.122  This ruling “avoided any 
constitutional judgment” and offered no guidance on “what further 
proceedings may become necessary” after enemy combatants filed 
habeas corpus petitions.123  Hamdi, although ruling that United States 
citizens have a constitutional right to challenge their detention as an 
enemy combatant, placed few meaningful limits on executive branch 
detentions.  Noting that “enemy-combatant proceedings may be tai-
lored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Execu-
tive,” the Court ruled both that hearsay evidence was admissible, and 
that “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in fa-
vor of the Government’s evidence.”124 
The Bush administration, as John Yoo put it, saw the limited reach 
of Hamdi and Rasul as creating an “opportunity” for the administra-
tion to regain control over its detention policy.125  In particular, the 
administration asked Congress to enact legislation that would limit 
federal court review of enemy combatant claims.  The administration 
also launched Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) as a more 
formal substitute for unilateral executive determinations of a de-
tainee’s enemy combatant status.126  Capitalizing on Rasul’s failure to 
consider the constitutional dimensions of enemy combatant claims, 
CSRTs largely operated as a rubber stamp of administration determi-
nations.  In 2006, ninety-nine out of 102 detainees brought before 
CSRTs were designated as enemy combatants.127  The Justice Depart-
ment reconvened CSRTs to reconsider the remaining three cases 
 
122 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467 (2004). 
123 Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 9–10 (2009) 
(quoting Rasul, 542 U.S. at 468). 
124 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 533–34. 
125 Yoo, supra note 115. 
126 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy, Order 
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) (on file with author). 
127 A. Wallace Tashima, The War on Terror and the Rule of Law, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 245, 254 
(2008) (discussing CSRT procedures and noting that “[a] review of the available records 
of CSRT proceedings shows that, in at least three of 102 full proceedings, detainees were 
not found to be enemy combatants”). 
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and, ultimately, the remaining three were determined to be enemy 
combatants.128 
Hamdi and Rasul were both “narrow, incompletely theorized [mi-
nimalist] decisions.”129  And while newspapers and academics focused 
their attention on the Court’s open-ended declaration that “a state of 
war is not a blank check for the President,”130 the decisions did not 
meaningfully limit the executive.  Well aware that Congress and the 
American people supported the President’s military commission ini-
tiative,131 the Court understood that a sweeping denunciation of ad-
ministration policies might trigger a fierce backlash.132  Moreover, by 
ruling that Congress had authorized the President’s power to detain 
enemy combatants (through its post-9/11 Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force Resolution), and by suggesting that the Court would 
make use of pro-government presumptions when reviewing military 
commission decision making, the Court formally took national secu-
rity interests into account.133  Actions taken by the executive in re-
sponse to these rulings underscore that the Court’s de minimis de-
mands neither risked national security nor executive branch non-
acquiescence. 
None of this is to say that the 2004 decisions were without impact.  
Following Rasul, for example, the administration understood that it 
needed to make use of some type of military court review—a re-
quirement that may have impacted the military’s handling of enemy 
combatants.  At the same time, the Court did not issue a potentially 
debilitating blow to the Bush administration by decisively and re-
soundingly rejecting key elements of the administration’s legal pol-
icy.134  Instead, the Court simply carved out space for itself to review 
administration policy-making—without setting meaningful bounda-
ries on what the administration could or could not do. 
Talking A Lot But Not Saying Anything:  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.135  Al-
though decisively rejecting Bush administration claims that it had in-
herent authority to establish military tribunals, Hamdan did little 
more than return the military tribunal issue to the political process.  
 
128 Id. at 254–55. 
129 Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 54 (2004). 
130 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
131 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 31 (discussing 9/11 and public support for the Bush 
Military Comission proposal by a greater than 2-1 margin). 
132 See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 28 (providing a detailed explanation of how the Court 
takes potential backlash into account when deciding a case). 
133 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
134 See Greenberger & Bravin, supra note 3 (commenting on Rasul). 
135 Portions of this subpart are drawn from Devins, supra note 89. 
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Three months after the decision, a Republican Congress authorized 
the administration’s military tribunal policy—including the rejection 
of federal court review of the habeas filings of enemy combatants.136  
For reasons I will now detail, Hamdan imposed few real world limits 
on the Bush administration’s enemy combatant policies. 
Newspaper and academic commentary on Hamdan largely focused 
on the Court’s dual determinations that the President could not uni-
laterally establish military tribunals and that Congress had not au-
thorized the administration’s initiative.137  For the administration, 
however, Hamdan was a setback with a “sterling silver lining.”138  Pres-
ident Bush emphasized that the Court accepted both “his use of the 
detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba” and that statutorily au-
thorized “military commissions are an appropriate venue for trying 
terrorists.”139  For White House Press Secretary Tony Snow, the ad-
ministration was focusing on what the Court had not said:  “[I]t has 
not said, you can’t hold them; it hasn’t said, you can’t try them; it 
hasn’t said, you have to send them back.”140 
In understanding administration efforts to use Hamdan to catapult 
its military tribunal initiative, two features of the Court’s ruling stand 
out.  First, the Court worked hard to partner itself with Congress—so 
that its decision would be understood as an effort to buoy legislative 
power.  Four of the five Justices who rejected the administration’s 
claim of inherent executive power wrote separately to state that the 
“Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single 
ground: . . . . Congress has denied the President the legislative au-
thority to create military commissions.”141  These Justices, moreover, 
charted a course for the President, suggesting that he return “to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”142  Second (and 
 
136 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  In Boume-
diene v. Bush, the Supreme Court invalidated the Military Commission Act.  Boumediene 
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  See infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 123, at 13; Krauthammer, supra note 116; Lane, supra 
note 75; McGinnis, supra note 110, at 294.  See also Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkani-
zation, Hamdan Is a Big Deal Regardless of What Congress Does, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-is-big-deal-regardless-of-what.html (June 
30, 2006, 5:23 EST) (discussing the dual determinations by the Court). 
138 David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Hamdan, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A12. 
139 President’s Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS 1553, 1573 (2006); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justices Tacitly Backed Use of 
Guantánamo, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A14. 
140 Tony Snow, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing (June 29, 2006), 2006 WL 1782179, 
at *7. 
141 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
142 Id. 
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relatedly), the Court did not speak to Congress’s power either to sta-
tutorily authorize military tribunals or to limit federal court consid-
eration of enemy combatant habeas petitions.  Indeed, the Court 
skirted such a controversy in Hamdan.  It interpreted a December 
2005 statute limiting federal court review of enemy combatant habeas 
petitions143 as having only prospective application (so that the Court 
would have to consider whether Congress could strip it of jurisdiction 
to hear the Hamdan case).144 
At bottom, the Hamdan decision returned the military tribunal is-
sue to the political branches.  Rather than foreclose democratic out-
lets, the Court signaled Congress and the administration that they 
might well back a statutorily authorized military tribunal program.  
The administration, of course, followed the Court’s lead and the Re-
publican Congress largely complied with administration policy pref-
erences—enacting a Military Commissions Act that generally tracked 
administration preferences.145  Furthermore, when the Court issued 
its ruling in Hamdan, not a single Guantánamo prisoner had been 
tried by a military commission.  The ruling, in other words, did not 
impact extant cases.  Indeed, with the President and Congress return-
ing to the drawing board to sort out a legislative solution, the imme-
diate effect of the ruling was only to further delay future trials.  All 
the while, the administration continued to freely detain enemy com-
batants at Guantánamo. 
In highlighting the limited reach of Hamdan, I am not arguing 
that the case was inconsequential.  Aside from the embarrassment of 
yet another high court defeat, the administration was forced to cut a 
deal acceptable to Congress.146  And while a Republican Congress was 
likely to back the administration (especially since Congress had en-
acted legislation supportive of the administration’s enemy combatant 
initiative six months earlier), the administration nevertheless had to 
expend time and political capital in pushing through legislation that 
varied, ultimately, from the administration’s initial bill.  In particular, 
 
143 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2742 (2005). 
144 For a detailed analysis of the Court’s decision to cast the Detainee Treatment Act this way, 
see Devins, supra note 89, at 1583. 
145 Richard B. Schmitt & Julian E. Barnes, Bush Signs Tough Rules on Detainees, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 2006, at A1 (reporting that President Bush signed allowing for the detention and 
prosecution of terrorism suspects). 
146 Correspondingly, by rejecting inherent presidential power to establish military tribunals, 
the Court imposed a cost on Congress—forcing it to take a formal position on the neces-
sity of military tribunals. 
518 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
Republican Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John War-
ner insisted on the addition of anti-torture provisions to the bill.147 
At the same time, it is clear that Hamdan was far less consequential 
than academic or media commentary would suggest.  Without mini-
mizing the Court’s repudiation of the Bush administration’s inherent 
power argument, Hamdan was anything but (as Walter Dellinger put 
it) “the most important decision on presidential power and the rule 
of law ever.  Ever.”148  Hamdan, instead, reflected the Court’s pen-
chant for sidestepping knotty issues involving the scope of presiden-
tial war making by focusing, instead, on the second-order question of 
whether the right processes were used to make the decisions at is-
sue.149  Correspondingly, with Congress already having enacted legis-
lation supporting the administration’s enemy combatant initiative, 
the Court—notwithstanding the President’s ever diminishing sup-
port150—did not want to risk legislative branch opprobrium by issuing 
a more decisive ruling in Hamdan. 
By returning the enemy combatant issue to the political process, 
the Court neither risked the nation’s security nor executive non-
acquiescence.  The decision did not order the release of any enemy 
combatant; indeed, the decision did not rule out that Congress could 
authorize a military tribunal system that mimicked the system that the 
 
147 Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 9, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 
45 (citing that Senator Graham, along with Republican Senators John McCain and John 
Warner, drafted a bill with the goal of preventing torture of enemy fighters). 
148 Dellinger, supra note 1; see also supra notes 50–51, 57 (sampling other media and aca-
demic commentary about Hamdan).  In calling attention to academic and media hyper-
bole, I do not mean to suggest that academics were unaware of the potentially limited 
practical reach of decisions like Hamdan, Rasul, and Hamdi.  See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, 
Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1014–15 (2008) 
(framing her article as an “answer” to the question:  “Why is it that litigation concerning 
the alleged enemy combatants . . . has been going on for more than six years and almost 
nothing seems to have actually been decided?”). 
149 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Uni-
lateralism:  An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that during times of war the judiciary has focused on 
whether the correct institutional processes have been used to make a decision rather than 
substantive rights).  See also Sunstein, supra note 129, at 50–51; Posting of Jack Balkin to 
Balkinization, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html (June 29, 2006, 13:07 EST) (argu-
ing that what the Hamdan Court has done is to limit “the President by forcing him to go 
back to Congress” and, in so doing, the Court has used “the democratic process as a lever 
to discipline and constrain the President’s possible overreaching”).  For a related argu-
ment, see Martinez, supra note 148, at 1018 (contending that the Court typically focuses 
on process in war-on-terror cases but that the line between process and substance is 
somewhat illusory). 
150 See POLLINGREPORT.COM, supra note 69. 
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administration had in place.  Correspondingly, by preserving democ-
ratic outlets for the administration to bargain with a generally sup-
portive Republican Congress, there was next-to-no risk of executive 
branch non-acquiescence.  More than anything, Hamdan delayed the 
ultimate showdown between the Supreme Court and the Bush ad-
ministration over the constitutionality of foreclosing habeas corpus 
review of military commission decision making. 
A Marked Departure or the Inevitable Next Step:  Making Sense of Boum-
ediene v. Bush.  In March 2007, the first wave of constitutional chal-
lenges to the Military Commission Act made their way to the Su-
preme Court.151  At that time, the Justices did not want to reenter this 
fray and, in April 2007, the Court denied certiorari.  Justices Stevens 
and Kennedy attached a written explanation to the certiorari de-
nial—stating that the Court ought to steer clear of this dispute until 
enemy combatants had made use of all legal remedies available to 
them under the congressionally approved military tribunal scheme.152  
This decision is very much consistent with prior Court rulings.  The 
Court preserved a role for itself without formally entering the dispute 
and second-guessing the adequacy of Military Commission Act pro-
cedures. 
Two months later, the Court reversed course and agreed to rehear 
the case.153  This reversal was a marked departure from normal Su-
preme Court practice.  “[I]n the absence of an intervening court de-
cision or some other landscape-changing development,” as Linda 
Greenhouse reported, the Court had only granted such rehearings 
on two occasions—“one [in] 1930 and the other [in] 1947.”154  In un-
derstanding the Court’s about-face, there is little question that revela-
tions about the inner-workings of Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
played a significant role.  As discussed in Part I, the Court was pre-
sented with documents suggesting that CSRT proceedings were a 
sham.155 
The question remains:  Did the Court break from its practice of is-
suing incremental decisions that did not fundamentally challenge the 
 
151 Greenhouse, supra note 123, at 17. 
152 Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (stating that Supreme Court would fol-
low traditional rules in requiring exhaustion of available legal remedies before granting 
writ of certiorari). 
153 Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160, 1160 (2007) (granting petition for rehearing). 
154 Greenhouse, supra note 123, at 17 (citing EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE 821 (9th ed. 2007)). 
155 See Declaration of Stephen Abraham, supra note 83, at 4 (discussing Lieutenant Colonel 
Abraham’s assertions that the CSRT process was influenced by command and was largely 
a deception). 
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President’s enemy combatant initiative?  Did Boumediene, unlike ear-
lier rulings, risk national security or elected branch backlash?  After 
all, the Court ruling—unlike earlier decisions—did speak to the con-
stitutional merits of a military tribunal system that denied habeas 
corpus review to enemy combatants.  Concluding that the writ of ha-
beas corpus is an “essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers 
scheme,” an “essential design of the Constitution,” and a writ that 
generally “protects persons [not just] citizens,” the Boumediene Court 
decisively repudiated the Military Commission Act’s habeas-stripping 
provisions.156 
For this very reason, Boumediene was seen as “historic”157 and 
“among the Court’s most important modern statements on the sepa-
ration of powers.”158  At a minimum, it was seen as the death knell to 
the military tribunal system championed by President Bush and the 
Congress that enacted the MCA.  Upon closer inspection, however, 
Boumediene is a far less dramatic, far less consequential decision.  
While the Court certainly made broad pronouncements about the 
centrality of habeas corpus and the illegitimacy of the Bush admini-
stration campaign to substitute military tribunals for judicial review, 
the Justices had no reason to think that the practical consequences of 
their handiwork would meaningfully impede elected officials from 
pursuing their preferred policy on enemy combatants.  Instead, Bou-
mediene seemed more a rebuke of the policies and practices of the 
outgoing Bush administration, than an effect to fundamentally retool 
future executive branch practices. 
When the Court agreed to hear the case, Democrats (who were 
nearly unanimous in voting against the habeas-stripping provision in 
the MCA) controlled the Congress.  More significant, when the Court 
decided the case, presumptive presidential candidates Barack Obama 
and John McCain had both promised to close Guantánamo Bay.159  In 
commenting about the decision, Senator McCain—who had voted for 
the habeas-stripping provision—said the decision “obviously concerns 
me . . . [but I have] always favored closing . . . Guantánamo Bay.”160  
Needless to say, congressional Democrats, including Senator Barack 
 
156 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246–47 (2008). 
157 See Barnes, supra note 3. 
158 See Greenhouse, supra note 123, at 18; Greenberger & Bravin, supra note 3 (describing 
the Supreme Court’s rulings as “landmark decisions” and “momentous”). 
159 At this time, the Bush administration had also said that it thought Guantánamo should be 
closed.  See Myers, supra note 5. 
160 Perine, supra note 5, at 1638 (quoting Senator John McCain). 
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Obama, expressed support for the Court’s ruling.161  Against this 
backdrop, the Court understood that its decision (issued less than 
five months before the presidential elections) would not trigger any 
type of political backlash. 
For much the same reason, the Court understood that its decision 
posed few national security risks.  The Court said nothing about the 
President’s power to indefinitely detain enemy combatants, nor did 
the Court detail how habeas proceedings were to be conducted.162  
The Court, moreover, said nothing about the availability of habeas cor-
pus by enemy combatants held outside U.S. soil or at facilities (like 
Guantánamo) that were under the control of the United States.163  As-
suming that the next administration would close Guantánamo, the 
decision would only impact governmental practices for a short time.164  
More than that, the Court had been told by the Bush administration 
that “any reopening of the prisoners’ right to habeas would not be 
swift, but would face a variety of ‘fundamental and unprecedented is-
sues’ complicating that process.”165  In other words, the Court under-
stood that the Bush administration would do everything in its power 
to slow down the release of enemy combatants during its final months 
in office.166  For all these reasons, Boumediene should not be seen as an 
attempt by the Court to meaningfully transform U.S. policy towards 
enemy combatants (a decision that might risk national security or 
prompt an elected government backlash).  Instead, Boumediene prin-
cipally served as a vehicle for the Court to make strong symbolic 
statements about the judicial power to “say what the law is” and, cor-
 
161 See id. (quoting Senator Barack Obama as saying that the decision marked “an important 
step toward re-establishing our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law”). 
162 See Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2008/July/08-opa-633.html (discussing the institutional challenges the Department will 
continue to face following the decision). 
163 See Brief for Respondents in Opposition, supra note 40, at 23 (arguing that it is sover-
eignty and not control which dictates the availability of habeas corpus). 
164 The MCA was not formally limited to Guantánamo, applying instead to all cases involving 
the detention of enemy combatants.  See Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 
136.  With that said, there was only one enemy combatant held on U.S. soil at the time of 
Boumediene. 
165 Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, U.S.:  Detainee Habeas Cases Would Be Slow, 
http://scotusblog.com/wp/us-detainee-habeas-cases-would-be-slow/ (April 2, 2008, 10:06 
EST). 
166 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene and until Barack Obama was sworn 
in as President, twenty-three detainees had succeeded in post-Boumediene habeas corpus 
proceedings but only three had been released from Guantánamo.  See AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, USA:  DETAINEES CONTINUE TO BEAR COSTS OF DELAY AND LACK OF 
REMEDY 82 (2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/050/2009/en 
/dfccba17-8b5a-430a-9059-af374d5d8c2d/amr510502009eng.pdf. 
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respondingly, the necessity of the political branches to respect the 
centrality of habeas corpus limits on governmental power. 
*  *  * 
In November 2008, Boumediene’s limited reach seemed secure.  
Barack Obama (who voted against the MCA and embraced Boumedi-
ene) won the presidency and the Democratic party expanded their 
control of Congress.  By the summer of 2009, however, there was rea-
son to question whether Guantánamo would be closed and whether 
the Obama administration would fully disavow the practices of its 
predecessor.167  For its part, the Supreme Court initially steered clear 
of Obama-era practices.  In the spring of 2009, they agreed to moot 
an ongoing dispute between the executive and an enemy combatant 
held at a U.S. army base; in the summer of 2009, they refused to act 
on a certiorari petition by fourteen Chinese Muslim Uighurs (parties 
to the original Boumediene litigation who had successfully filed a ha-
beas petition but nevertheless remained at Guantánamo).168  In the 
fall of 2009, the Court agreed to hear the Uighur petition but delayed 
oral argument until March 2010 (thereby allowing the Obama ad-
ministration time to either close Guantánamo or relocate the Uighur 
petitioners).169 
In Part III of this Essay, I will argue that the Court’s actions in the 
first year of the Obama administration are cut from the same cloth as 
its decision to intervene in Bush-era disputes.  As this section has sug-
gested, the Court has never risked national security or executive 
branch non-acquiescence in its enemy combatant decision making.  
Moreover, as I argued in Part I, Court decision making in this area 
has largely tracked social and political forces.  For reasons I will now 
detail, the Court’s decisions both to steer clear of this issue in the 
spring and summer of 2009 and its fall 2009 decision to hear the 
Uighur petition match past Court practices.  Throughout the enemy 
combatant dispute, the Court has found ways to expand its authority 
without risking an institutionally costly backlash. 
III.  CONCLUSION:  THE PAST IS PROLOGUE 
Supreme Court interventions in the enemy combatant disputes 
never pushed the limits of what was acceptable to the political 
 
167 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
168 See infra notes 171–81 and accompanying text. 
169  See supra notes 17–19. 
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branches of government.  The Court, instead, maximized its authority 
by moving incrementally and expanding judicial power in ways gen-
erally acceptable to the political branches.  This was true of Bush-era 
decision making and there is no reason to think that the Court will 
depart from past practices during the Obama administration. 
Consider, for example, the Court’s March 2009 decision to back 
away from a case involving Bush administration efforts to detain a le-
gal resident without charges.  After agreeing—in December 2008—to 
hear a challenge to the Bush administration’s detention of Ali Saleh 
Kahlah al-Marri at a South Carolina Navy brig, the Court sided with 
the Obama administration and removed the case from its docket.170  
The administration had claimed the case was moot because—in Feb-
ruary 2009—it formally filed federal criminal charges against al-Marri 
(so that he would be tried in federal court and not held indefinitely 
at a military base).171  Mr. Marri’s lawyers objected, arguing (unsuc-
cessfully) that the administration could subsequently relocate him to 
a military base and, consequently, the Court should still resolve his 
legal challenge.172 
The Court’s decisions to hear and then moot al-Marri are readily 
understandable.  The Fourth Circuit had upheld the Bush admini-
stration in al-Marri and—when agreeing to hear the case—the Jus-
tices had good reason to slap down the Bush administration for their 
continuing efforts to sidestep federal court review over enemy com-
batant policy-making.  Not only had the Court taken a strong stand in 
favor of judicial review in Boumediene and other decisions, but the No-
vember 2008 election of Barack Obama and the Democratic Congress 
further solidified the Court’s position with elected officials and the 
American people.  And, with none of the eighteen amicus briefs in 
the case supporting the Bush administration,173 a Court ruling against 
 
170 See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Al-Marri Detention Case Ended, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/al-marri-overruled/ (Mar. 6, 2009, 13:13 EST) (“The 
Court’s action ended the Qatari national’s case.”). 
171 See  David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Give Qaeda Suspect A Civilian Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1 (considering the changes in policy by the Justice Department 
and the Obama administration); see also Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Court Puts Off 
Decision On Indefinite Detention, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2009, at A5 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that a President may indefinitely detain a legal U.S. resident as a terror 
suspect). 
172 See Johnston & Lewis, supra note 171.  The al-Marri case never went to trial; a plea deal 
was struck between the government and Mr. Al-Marri.  See John Schwartz, Plea Agreement 
Reached With Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A16 (“Mr. Marri reached a 
deal with the government to plead guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to Al 
Qaeda.”). 
173 See Jane Meyer, The Hard Cases, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 2009, at 38. 
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Bush administration actions would have further buoyed the Court’s 
status with academics and other interest groups.  By March 2009, 
however, there was no good reason to ask the new administration to 
sort out its views on the al-Marri detention.  Candidate Obama had 
campaigned against the Bush administration efforts to fence out fed-
eral courts from war-on-terror litigation.  Indeed, when asking the 
Court to moot the case, the Obama administration told the Justices 
that it was willing to have the Fourth Circuit ruling vacated (showing 
“that the government is not attempting to preserve its victory while 
evading review”).174  Against this backdrop, there was simply no rea-
son for the Justices to force the Obama administration to formally 
disavow or embrace Bush administration legal arguments.  An Obama 
administration decision disavowing Bush administration arguments 
would not strengthen the Court’s position vis-à-vis the executive (as 
the Obama Justice Department had already conceded the Court’s au-
thority to vacate the lower court ruling); an administration decision 
supporting Bush administration arguments would set the stage for a 
costly battle between the Court and the new administration.  A deci-
sion on the merits, moreover, would have opened the Court up to 
charges of judicial over-reaching.  In its brief seeking to moot al-
Marri, the government argued that keeping the case alive “would lead 
only to an advisory opinion with no real-world impact on any individ-
ual” and that the Court should not reach out to decide “in a hypo-
thetical posture” “complex constitutional questions” about the line 
where “national security policy and the Constitution intersect.”175 
The Court’s participation in Kiyemba likewise displays the Court’s 
sensitivity to its status vis-à-vis the other branches and to the risks of 
unnecessarily interjecting itself in national security policy.  This was 
true of both the June 2009 decision to hold over the appeal of the 
Uighur petitioners and the October 2009 decision to hear the case 
(but to schedule oral arguments so as to delay any decision until the 
summer of 2010). 176   
June 2009 was too early for the Court to enter this dispute.  Even 
though petitioners cast the case as an opportunity for the Court to 
defend its turf (suggesting that Boumediene had become an empty 
shell and it was up to the Court to give meaning to the decision),177 
 
174 Denniston, supra note 170. 
175 Id. 
176 See supra notes 11–19 for additional discussion. 
177 See Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 168, at 1 (“As we approach Boumediene’s anni-
versary, many prisoners have ‘won’ their habeas cases, but few have been released. . . . It 
has become the hortatory branch.”). 
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the Court well understood the costs of entering this dispute.  At that 
time, the Obama administration and Democratic Congress were sort-
ing out their policy priorities on Guantánamo, Bagram detainees, 
and much more.  Correspondingly, the Court had reason to think 
that a ruling demanding the relocation of Uighur detainees to the 
United States would not sit well with either the administration or 
Congress.  Not only did the Obama administration oppose the reloca-
tion of the Uighurs to the United States,178 Congress enacted legisla-
tion in June 2009 that severely limited the President’s power to move 
Guantánamo detainees to the United States or resettle them in an-
other country.179   
By holding the issue over, however, the Court gave the Obama 
administration time both to sort out its policy priorities and to relo-
cate the Uighur detainees (and, in so doing, to try to moot the 
case).180  In its brief opposing certiorari, the Obama administration 
made clear that it was trying both to close Guantánamo and to relo-
cate the Uighur petitioners and asked the Court to respect the “ef-
forts of the political Branches to resolve issues relating to petitioners 
and other individuals located at Guantanamo Bay.”181  Furthermore, 
the decision to hold the case over bought the Court time to see how 
the enemy combatant issue would play out among politicians, interest 
groups, the media, and the American people.  As Part I reveals, Court 
enemy combatant decisions track social and political forces.  As Part 
II reveals, the Court has moved incrementally—advancing its author-
ity to say “what the law is” without risking backlash or national secu-
rity.  
The Court’s October 2009 decision to hear Kiyemba does not 
break from this pattern.  By scheduling oral arguments for spring 
2009, the Court both provided elected government with additional 
time to settle this issue and provided itself with an opportunity to ca-
librate its decision making against the backdrop of elected govern-
ment action and other subsequent developments.182  More than that, 
 
178 Id. at 6. 
179 See Herszenhorn, supra note 6 (discussing the political opposition to moving any Guantá-
namo prisoners to U.S. soil). 
180 See Denniston, supra note 170 (“The order also approved transfer of [Al-Marri] from mili-
tary custody to civilian custody . . . .”). 
181 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 26, Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-1234 (U.S. May 
29, 2009). 
182 Indeed, for reasons noted in the introduction, it is possible that the Obama administra-
tion might welcome a ruling against the government.  See supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text.  Aside from further discrediting Bush-era policies, it may be that a Court ruling 
is the only way to break up the political logjam that—as of December 2009—is preventing 
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since Boumediene only decided the threshold issue that enemy com-
batants were entitled to habeas corpus relief, Kiyemba is a good vehi-
cle for the Court to provide some details on how habeas proceedings 
should be conducted.  In particular, there is little prospect that the 
decision will impact the rights on many Guantánamo detainees.  By 
the summer of 2010, Guantánamo may be closed; if not, most detain-
ees who prevail in habeas proceedings are likely to have been relo-
cated to another country.  Moreover, Kiyemba raises a quite narrow is-
sue, namely, whether federal courts can mandate that Guantánamo 
detainees be relocated to the United States if no foreign nation will 
take them.183  In other words, there is next to no prospect that Ki-
yemba will result in the type of scrutinizing judicial review that might 
raise national security risks (assuming, of course, that the Court will 
rule against the administration).  Instead, Kiyemba seems likely to fur-
ther tighten judicial control over the executive—but only in a very 
modest way. 
Throughout the course of its enemy combatant decision making, 
the Court has moved incrementally.  In so doing, the Court has ex-
panded its authority vis-à-vis the President.  Obama administration ef-
forts to moot al-Marri and to relocate Uighur detainees (thereby 
mooting that litigation) speak to the administration’s desire to avoid 
Supreme Court rulings that might limit the scope of presidential 
power.  Unlike the Bush administration (whose politically tone deaf 
arguments paved the way for anti-administration rulings),184 the Ob-
ama administration understands that the Court has become a player 
in the enemy combatant issue. 
What is striking here, is that the Court never took more than it 
could get—it carved out space for itself without risking the nation’s 
security or political backlash.  Its 2004 and 2006 rulings provided am-
ple opportunity for the President to pursue his enemy combatant ini-
tiative.  Its 2008 ruling in Boumediene, while clearly constraining the 
political branches, reflected the views of the new Democratic majority 
in Congress and (to a lesser extent) the views of presidential candi-
dates Obama and McCain.185  Its decision to steer clear of early Ob-
 
the Obama administration from closing Guantánamo.  For additional discussion of how 
judicial invalidations sometimes further elected government priorities, see Devins, supra 
note 21; Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:  Legislative Deferences to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”:  Po-
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SCI. REV. 583 (2005). 
183 See Finn, supra note 17. 
184 See supra Part I.A. 
185 See supra Part II. 
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ama-era disputes likewise avoids the risks of a costly backlash while 
creating incentives for the Obama administration to take judicial au-
thority into account (by settling these cases outside of court).186  Put 
another way, by taking prevailing social and political forces into ac-
count, the Court was able to flex its muscles without meaningfully 
undermining the policy preferences of the President and Congress. 
I, of course, recognize that the Court’s willingness to engage the 
executive and, in so doing, to nullify a signature campaign of the 
Bush administration, is a significant break from the judiciary’s recent 
practice of steering clear of disputes tied to unilateral presidential 
war making.187  At the same time, I see the Court’s willingness to chal-
lenge, and not defer, as not at all surprising.  The Bush administra-
tion made arguments that backed the Court into a corner.  The 
Court could either bow at the altar of presidential power, or it could 
find a way to slap the President down.  It is to be expected that the 
Court chose to find a way to preserve its authority to “say what the law 
is.”188  The Justices, after all, have incentives to preserve the Court’s 
role in our system of checks and balances—especially when their de-
cisions enhance their reputations with media and academic elites.189  
This is true of the Supreme Court in general, and arguably more true 
of the current Court—given its penchant to claim judicial supremacy 
and given the importance of these institutional concerns to the 
Court’s so-called swing Justices.190  It is also noteworthy that the en-
emy combatant cases were at the very core of the judicial function.  At 
oral arguments in Hamdan, Justice Kennedy emphasized the impor-
tance of habeas corpus relief,191 suggesting that limitations on habeas 
relief would “threaten[] the status of the judiciary as a co-equal part-
ner of the legislature and the executive.”192 
 
186 See supra notes 170–81 and accompanying text. 
187 See Devins & Fisher, supra note 109 (discussing the Court’s practice of ducking war powers 
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ern Court’s view that the resolution of all constitutional matters lies within its jurisdiction, 
the specific facts of Hamdan also contributed to the Court’s decision.”). 
191 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42–44, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) 
(No. 05-184). 
192 Alison Holland, Note, Across the Border and Over the Line:  Congress’s Attack on Criminal Aliens 
and the Judiciary Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 27 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 385, 398 (2000).  Justice Kennedy’s comments at oral arguments emphasized the need 
for enemy combatants to be “tried by a lawful tribunal” and suggested that the denial of 
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One final comment on the nature of the dialogue that took and is 
taking place between the three branches on the enemy combatant is-
sue:  Throughout the Bush-era, these cases were anything but a con-
stitutional dialogue.  The executive persisted in making the same ar-
gument, and, as its political fortunes diminished, the Court carved 
over more and more issue space for itself.  For its part, the Bush-era 
Congress played no meaningful role—it simultaneously backed the 
executive while signaling to the Court that it would support judicial 
invalidation of executive initiatives.  With a new administration in 
place, there is reason to think that the inter-branch dynamic will 
change.  The Obama administration has advanced its policies while 
pursuing a less confrontational course; avoiding absolutist arguments 
and trying to steer clear of an adverse Supreme Court ruling.  In so 
doing, the administration has yet to launch the type of broadsides 
that challenge the foundations of judicial authority.  Up until now, 
the Court has responded in kind, leaving the administration breath-
ing room to pursue its policies without a Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on the scope of presidential power.  It is a matter of 
pure speculation whether this pattern will continue.  At the same 
time, there is good reason to think that the Court will follow the path 
it has laid down in Bush-era cases, taking social and political forces 
into account so as to protect its turf without risking national security 
or elected government backlash. 
 
habeas relief raised a “structural,” not “procedural,” question.  See Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument, supra note 191, at 43.  Accordingly, there is reason to think that Justice Kennedy 
will be skeptical of Congress’s prohibition on habeas claims in the MCA. 
